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This document was updated on October 16, 2019 to include a brief rejoinder to WB’s response to the body
of our comment. Their response can be found here; our rejoinder is in the final section of this comment. We
are grateful to WB for their response, and especially for pointing out some errors and points of clarification
in a previous version of this comment.
We are grateful to Wang and Blei (2019) (hereafter WB) for drawing attention to the important and increas-
ingly popular project of using latent variable methods to control for unmeasured confounding. Prior causal
inference research on this topic has not been adequately communicated or disseminated, leaving room for
misconceptions, which we hope to begin to remedy in this discussion. We also appreciate that the authors
have sought and been receptive to our feedback about their work. We would also like to thank the editors for
giving us the opportunity to comment on this paper.
However, this paper has foundational errors. Specifically, the premise of the deconfounder, namely that a
variable that renders multiple causes conditionally independent also controls for unmeasured multi-cause
confounding, is incorrect. This can be seen by noting that no fact about the observed data alone can be
informative about ignorability, since ignorability is compatible with any observed data distribution. Methods
to control for unmeasured confounding may be valid with additional assumptions in specific settings (e.g.
Price et al., 2006; Kuroki and Pearl, 2014; Angrist and Pischke, 2008), but they cannot, in general, provide
a checkable approach to causal inference, and they do not, in general, require weaker assumptions than the
assumptions that are commonly used for causal inference. While this is outside the scope of this comment,
we note that much recent work on applying ideas from latent variable modeling to causal inference problems
suffers from similar issues.
Causal inference aims to draw inferences about the parameters of the full data distribution–the distribution
of the observed random variables and the potential outcomes–from realizations of the observed data dis-
tribution, which is generally a coarsened version of the full data distribution. For example, the full data
distribution for a conditionally ignorable model with binary treatment is of the form p(Y (1),Y (0),A,X),
where the following conditional independences hold on the counterfactual outcomes Y (1), and Y (0), the
treatment A and the set of baseline covariates X: Y (1) ⊥ A|X, and Y (0) ⊥ A|X. The parameter of interest
is often the average causal effect (ACE): E[Y (1)−Y(0)]. The observed data distribution, on the other hand,
is of the form P(Y,A,X), where the observed outcome Y is a coarsened version of Y (1) and Y (0), defined
by consistency as Y (1) ·A+Y (0) · (1− A). Causal inference problems are often viewed as missing data
problems, since every realization of the observed outcome Y yields exactly one of the potential outcomes
for the corresponding subject, with the other outcomes being missing data. With the deconfounder,WB aim
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to tackle settings with a vector A of multiple treatments, where baseline covariates are unobserved (except
for single-cause confounders, which we ignore throughout). In such cases, the observed data distribution
is a marginal distribution of the form p(Y,A), marginalized over the missing potential outcomes and the
unobserved confounders.
The deconfounder proposal can be loosely summarized as follows:
• Suppose ignorability for the effect of a vector of causes A on an outcome Y holds conditional on U :
A⊥ Y (a)|U .
• U is unobserved, but if it were observed then conditioning on and standardizing by U (covariate
adjustment, or the adjustment formula) would identify causal effects of A on Y , as in equation (2) of
WB.
• In lieu of the unmeasured U , and in the absence of any unmeasured single-cause confounders, one
can control for any variable Z such that A1, ...,Am are mutually independent conditional on Z, because
such a Z satisfies ingorability for all multi-cause confounders. Z is a substitute confounder for the true
confounderU .
In addition to the above, the authors impose several additional assumptions at various points throughout the
paper. We describe these below. Nevertheless, the assumptions, as stated, do not imply the claimed results.
1 Conditionally independent causes do not ensure conditional ignor-
ability.
The third step is the crux of the deconfounder. However, the criterion of conditional independence does not
suffice to make Z a valid substitute confounder. This criterion does not rule out the inclusion of variables that
may bias effects, nor does it ensure that all multi-cause confounders are captured by Z. Finding an observed
proxy that suffices to control for all confounding via covariate adjustment is related to a body of work on
complete adjustment criteria (Shpitser et al., 2010; Perkovic et al., 2015). Below we give a few examples
that violate these adjustment criteria, meaning that covariate adjustment is not a valid identification strategy,
but that are not excluded from the deconfounder.
1.1 The deconfounder may include variables that bias effects.
A substitute confounder constructed in order to render the causes mutually independent may include three
types of variables that undermine the ability to identify causal effects. M-bias colliders, such asM in the di-
rected acylic graph (DAG) in Figure 1 (d), and single-cause colliders, such asC in Figure 1 (c), are variables
that induce confounding (Cole et al., 2009; Elwert and Winship, 2014), and single-cause mediators, such as
R in Figure 1 (a) and D in Figure 1 (b), are variables that bias causal effects.
Both colliders and mediators are post-treatment variables. As WB note, it is crucial that all covariates
used to identify causal effects via the formula in (2) be pre-treatment variables, because conditioning on a
downstream effect of A may introduce bias in any direction (it need not bias effect estimates towards the
null). However, Lemma 4, which states that the substitute confounder Z is guaranteed to be pre-treatment,
is incorrect. We first give an intuitive counterexample in which mediators would be included in a substitute
confounder and then point out a problem in the proof of Lemma 4.
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Figure 1: (a) A DAG in which A1 and A2 are causally dependent. (b) A DAG with a single-cause mediator.
(c) A DAG with a single-cause collider. (d) A DAG with an M-bias collider.
Causes cannot be causally dependent. Suppose the causes A1, ...,Am can themselves have causal effects
on one another, as would be expected in most of the motivating examples described in the introduction (neu-
rons may cause one another to fire; enrolling in one social program may increase the chance that someone
will learn of or be referred to another social program; one medicine may be prescribed to treat side effects of
another or of a procedure). Specifically, consider the case depicted in Figure 1 (a), where A1 causes A2, and
in order to render them conditionally independent the deconfounder must include a variable, R, that breaks
this connection. However, the effect of A1 on Y is through R and therefore cannot be identified controlling
for R; depending on the relationships among A1, R, and Y , an estimator that controls for R could either
over- or underestimate the true effect. This scenario is directly analogous to longitudinal causal inference
problems with multiple time-varying treatments that contain time-varying confounders, variables that serve
as confounders for some treatments and as mediators for other treatments. If there is an unmeasured con-
founder for the R-Y relationship (represented by V and the dashed arrows in Figure 1 (a)), then conditioning
on R fails to identify the direct effects of A on Y , because it opens a confounding pathway through V . See
Hernan and Robins (2020) for an overview of these issues.
The answer to the question posed in Appendix B of WB, "Can the causes be causally dependent among
themselves?” is therefore "no." If they are causally dependent then the deconfounder, by dint of rendering
the causes independent, breaks some of the structure among the causes A, and as was originally established
in the time-varying treatment setting, this undermines the identification of joint effects ofA onY by covariate
adjustment.
Analysis of Lemma 4. This simple argument also serves as a counterexample to Lemma 4, which states
that the deconfounder does not pick up any post-treatment variables and can be treated as a pre-treatment
covariate. This is necessarily false whenever the causes are causally dependent among themselves, but it
need not hold even if the causes are not causally dependent, see below.
The proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix I states that "Inferring the substitute confounder Zi is separated from
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estimating the potential outcome. It implies that the substitute confounder is independent of the potential
outcomes conditional on the causes.” The proof invokes the assumption that Z ⊥ Y (A)|A. By the consis-
tency property in causal inference, which defines the observed data variable Y as ∑a I(A = a)Y (a), Y (A) is
equal to Y , which implies Z ⊥Y |A. This conditional independence cannot hold for any Z that satisfies ignor-
ability, except in trivial settings. Limiting inquiry to settings in which there exists a deterministic function
of the causes that suffices to identify causal effects rules out almost everything that is typically considered
confounding.1 (This is also the case replacing Y (A) with Y (a) in the original assumption (note the lower
case a), since Y is a fixed function of Y (a) and A.)
In fact, confounders confound because they are related to potential outcomes even conditional on the ob-
served treatment and outcome. For example, if a person knows that their potential pain status under treatment
A = tylenol is preferable to their potential pain status under treatment A = no tylenol, then they are more
likely to take tylenol when they have a headache–so Y (a) affects A. Obviously Y (a) also affects Y , their
pain status after treatment, so Y (a) is itself a confounder. While this may be an extreme example, in general
confounders are, almost by definition, intricately linked to the potential outcomes.
When the causes are not causally dependent (which is the setting for which WB recommend using the de-
confounder, see Appendix B), can we ensure that a substitute confounder does not contain post-treatment
variables? Any mediator or collider caused by more than one cause will be excluded from the substitute con-
founder, because such a variable is a collider between its causes and conditioning on it induces, rather than
eliminates, dependence among the causes. But single-cause mediators and colliders may be incorporated
into the substitute confounder.
Single-cause mediators and colliders. A single-cause mediator, such as D in Figure 1 (b) will generally
not be required in order to render the causes conditionally independent, and the same is true of a single cause
collider, such as C in Figure 1 (c). But in the absence of Lemma 4 we do not immediately see any way to
guarantee that single-cause mediators and colliders would be excluded from substitute confounders. In par-
ticular, if the dashed arrow in Figure 1 (b) is present, so that the unmeasured confounder is not independent
of the mediator, then it seems plausible that a substitute confounder would include some or partial informa-
tion about the mediator. Similarly, if the dashed arrow in Figure 1 (c) is present, so that the unmeasured
confounder is not independent of the collider, then it seems plausible that a substitute confounder would
include some or partial information about the collider.
M-bias colliders. Even if one could exclude post-treatment random variables from the deconfounder, M-
bias colliders, like M in Figure 1 (d), can be pre-treatment. They provide a counterexample to the premise
that a pre-treatment Z that renders the causes conditionally independent suffices to control for multi-cause
confounding of A on Y, and specifically to Lemmas 1 and 2. While conditioning onU itself would suffice to
control for M-bias, if, in addition to M, Z captures the part of U that affects dependence among the causes
without capturing the part ofU that relates Am toM, then M-bias would remain.
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1We updated the statement of this result to reflect the fact that different definitions exist for the presence of confounding; thank you
to WB for drawing to our attention the fact a previous version was not entirely clear.
2We are grateful to WB for catching a mistake in a previous version of this counterexample.
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1.2 The deconfounder need not capture all multi-cause confounders.
We provide an example to illustrate that the deconfounder may not capture all multi-cause confounders, and
then we point out a flawed premise in the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. A related point is that the deconfounder
may not be able to control for confounding even if it does capture all multi-cause confounders; this is because
confounding involves the joint distribution of the causes and the potential outcomes, so in general learning
a latent confounder requires dealing with this joint distribution. This is established by a copula argument in
D’Amour (2019).
Conditioning on Z can render the causes mutually independent by separating a multi-cause confounder
U into single-cause components, while failing to control for the relationship between the causes and the
outcome. Here is an example: supposeU is a confounder of A1, A2, and Y , and suppose that, conditional on
Z, U ∼Uni f (0,1). ThenU |Z is decomposable into the sum of V andW , where V andW are independent.3
Further suppose that A1 only depends on V and A2 only depends onW . Then conditioning on Z renders A1
and A2 independent, but there is no reason to think that it controls for confounding byU .
This counterexample to the claim that the deconfounder controls for all multi-cause confounding is patho-
logical, but given the fact that modeling the marginal distribution of the causes can only tell us about the
joint distribution of the causes and the outcome under stringent assumptions or in degenerate models, we
expect counterexamples to be the rule, not the exception.
Analysis of Lemmas 1 and 2. The discussion above undermines the claim that the deconfounder, esti-
mated via a factor model of the causes, suffices for ignorability to hold. The argument for this claim in WB
is rather technical, but we briefly analyze it here. It is made through Lemma 1, which states that if A admits
a Kallenberg construction from the deconfounder then ignorability holds conditional on the deconfounder,
and Lemma 2, which states that all factor models of A admit a Kallenberg construction. However, Defini-
tion 3 misstates the Kallenberg construction for the relevant probability model. The probability model for
analyzing the causal effect of A on Y subject to confounding by Z is the model for the full data distribution;
the probability model that includes only the observed data is appropriate for prediction but not for causal
inference. The full data comprise (in chronological/causal order) the random variables {Y (a) : a ∈ A }, Z,
A, andY . Note that ignorability is a restriction on the full data distribution, not the observed data distribution
(which often has no restrictions in causal inference problems). Put another way, no fact about the observed
data alone can be informative about ignorability, since ignorability is compatible with any observed data dis-
tribution. Therefore, Theorem 5.10 of Kallenberg (1997) in fact implies Ai j
a.s.
= f j(Zi,{Y (a) : a ∈ A },Ui j)
rather than the construction given in equation (37) of WB, which omitted {Y (a) : a ∈A }. Thus, the Kallen-
berg construction used in the paper cannot link factor models to ignorability. A Kallenberg construction
on the full data, which could be informative about ignorability, is impossible to obtain given observed data
information alone.
3A random variable is decomposable if it is equal to the sum of independent random variables; a Uni f (0,1) random variable is
decomposable into a bernoulli random variable that takes the values 0 or .5 with equal probability and a uniform random variable over
(0,.5).
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1.3 When would a latent substitute confounder be expected to control for all multi-
cause confounding?
Identifying a latent substitute confounder from the observed data on A essentially requires the assumption
that learning structure on the causes suffices to learn about any joint structure linking the causes with the
outcome, in addition to the assumptions above.
A widely studied setting in which this would hold is whenU represents unknown structure that is common
to each Ak and to Y . This is likely to be the case in GWAS studies and in problems with clustered data
with unknown clusters. In GWAS studies, including in WB’s simulations,U represents population structure
that is common across all of the causes and the outcome. For example, U might be an ancestry matrix
indicating how n subjects are related to one another, and each of the causes and the outcome are expected
to show dependence across the n subjects due to this same ancestry matrix. In this setting, any subset of the
collection of variables with this same structure, that is any subset of {A1, ...,Am,Y}, can be used to learn the
common underlying population structure, in particular the set {A1, ...,Am} as is commonly done in practice
(Price et al., 2006).
Theorem 6 requires the deconfounder to be piecewise constant in the causes; this reduces the problem of
confounding to one of clustering.
Another example when a latent substitute confounder controls for all multi-cause confounding is the fully
parametric model given in Appendix C of WB.
2 Assumptions beyond ignorability
In this section we assume that we are in the class of problems for which latent substitute confounders are
known to perform well, e.g. in the GWAS or clustering setting. We argue that even for those limited settings
the assumptions required of the deconfounder are quite strong, and are not nonparametric. Below we discuss
the assumptions required for the deconfounder that go beyond those required for "classical causal inference."
In exchange for the assumptions listed below, "classical causal inference" requires the sole (but strong and
untestable) assumption of no unmeasured multi-cause confounders. Both the deconfounder and classical
methods require no unmeasured single-cause confounders, SUTVA, and overlap (or positivity).
Nonparametric identification. Although the terms parametric and nonparametric can mean different
things to different researchers, generally a causal effect is said to be nonparametrically identified if either
(a) the assumptions required for identification place no restrictions on the observed data distribution, except
possibly up to a set of distributions of measure zero (Bickel et al., 1993), or (b) the only restrictions on the
observed data distribution are those imposed by a nonparametric structural equation model. Such restric-
tions may include some conditional independences and inequality constraints. But causal effects cannot
be nonparametrically identified (in either sense) in the setting considered in WB; identification requires as-
sumptions that place substantial restrictions on the observed data distribution and on the structural equation
models.
Semi-parametric and parametric assumptions. Contrary to its statement, Theorem 6, which identifies
the joint causal effect of all of the causes on Y , rests on the parametric assumptions that the confounding
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variable is a clustering indicator and that the treatment effects are constant across clusters (no treatment-
confounder interaction). Furthermore, although it is not listed in the assumptions in the paper, in order for
f1(a,x) and f2(z) to be jointly estimable even though z is a deterministic function of a, Theorem 6 also
requires f1 to be more smooth than f2, e.g. they cannot be collinear.
Theorem 7 identifies the causal effect of a subset of k out of the m causes, assuming overlap/positivity for
those k causes: P((A1, ...,Ak)∈A |Zi)> 0 for any setA such thatP(A )> 0. Because the conditioning event
Zi is a deterministic function of A1, ...,Am, this is a stronger assumption than the classical overlap assumption,
and it greatly restricts the possible functional forms for the deterministic function of A that gives Z. This
restriction will be greatest when k is close to m. Two open questions are (1) whether these restrictions imply
that the model for Z is degenerate as m→ ∞ and (2) whether they restrict the observed data distribution in
addition to restricting the function of A that gives Z. Neither of these concerns is addressed in the paper,
leaving open the possibility that the statement of the theorem might be vacuous, requiring parametric and/or
additional causal assumptions in order for these conditions to be met.4 This framework, but with k << m
and the addition of parametric assumptions and exclusion restrictions (i.e. that most causes are null), is often
used to test the effects of many SNPs in GWAS studies (e.g. Price et al., 2006; Gagnon-Bartsch et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2017).
The number of causes must go to infinity. The identification results in WB require consistency of sub-
stitute confounders (Definition 4 of WB), which generally holds asymptotically as the number of causes, m,
goes to infinity. This is the case, for example, for probabilistic PCA and Poisson factorization, as discussed
by WB and for which (n+m)log(nm)/(nm)→ 0 ensures consistency. Consistency likely also requires ei-
ther (a) a parametric factor model or (b) that a discrete variable with finite support suffices to control for
confounding. It is not immediately clear what estimands are defined and identified in this limit, since The-
orems 6, 7, and 8 are written for finite m. Furthermore, it is not clear whether identification holds for any
finite m. Of course, desirable frequentist properties for estimators of causal effects often require asymptotic
arguments. However, in most settings that argument is required for estimation but not for identification; here
an asymptotic limit in both the number of causes and the number of subjects is required for unmeasured
confounding to be controlled for and therefore for identification.
However, the requirement that, in the limit, Z be a deterministic function of A suggests that it cannot, in
fact, control for confounding. This is because such a Z is independent of Y given A, which is not true of
confounders (see the analysis of Lemma 4 above). If causal effects are identifiable using such a Z, it must
be because bias due to unmeasured confounding is estimable with a function of A, and that function is not
collinear with the causal effects themselves. In this case the method would have to rely for identification not
on ignorability, but rather on an assumption that a biased, confounded effect and its bias are simultaneously
identified.
3 Conclusion
One of the most important roles of causal inference in statistics and data science is to be transparent about the
strong, usually untestable assumptions under which causal inference is possible (Pearl, 2000; Robins, 2001).
The burden for transparency about assumptions is arguably greater in causal inference than in other areas of
4We are grateful to WB for pointing out that a previous version of this statement was imprecise.
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statistics, because it is crucial that scientists and consumers of research, e.g. policy makers or doctors, have
the tools to reason about whether an association is in fact causal. To that end, our best current understanding
of when it is justified to use a substitute confounder based on a factor analysis to estimate causal estimands in
the presence of unmeasured confounding is under these conditions/assumptions (some of which are explicit
in WB):
1. No unmeasured single-cause confounders.
2. SUTVA
3. No M structures exist between A and Y.
4. The causes are not causally dependent.
5. No post-treatment variables are captured by Z.
6. Unmeasured multi-cause confounding is due to a dependence or clustering structure that is common
to each cause and to the outcome.
7. Z is consistent, which may rule out confounding altogether (see discussion above).
8. In the limit as the number of causes and the number of observations go to infinity.
9. One of the following:
(a) Confounding is due to a clustering indicator, treatment effects are constant in Z, continuous
causes, and relative smoothness constraints on functions of the causes and of Z identify joint
treatment effects of all of the causes (WB Theorem 6).
(b) Overlap for some causes identifies treatment effects for those causes (WB Theorem 7). This is at
best a semiparametric assumption given the definition of Z in terms of the causes (see discussion
of semiparametric and parametric assumptions above).
(c) Common values of Z identify conditional potential outcomes (WB Theorem 8).
Some of these assumptions may be able to be relaxed or replaced with different assumptions, but unfor-
tunately – we wish this were not the case! – it is impossible to identify causal effects in the presence of
unmeasured confounding with nonparametric or empirically verifiable assumptions.
4 Response to WB
We are grateful to WB for being willing to discuss their paper, and their rejoinder pointed out a few errors
and points of clarification in an earlier version of our comment (noted by footnotes above). Nevertheless,
we largely disagree with their rebuttals of our critiques of the deconfounder method. Most importantly:
• No formal argument is presented in either the paper or rejoinder to justify the claim that, because Z
is a function of many causes, it is precluded from inadvertently picking up single-cause colliders or
mediators. Let C in Figure 1 (c) or D in Figure 1 (b) be equal to a function g(·) of Am (and possibly
a random error), and suppose that Z is also a function of g(Am). Although this example is degenerate
from a causal perspective, it shows that Z can incorporate information about random variables that are
downstream of a single cause.
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• Given that the definition of a multi-cause confounder in Appendix E (arXiv version; Appendix H in
JASA) is about unconditional properties of a confounderU , this definition alone cannot rule out the
possibility ofU being separable after conditioning on Z.
• The claim that results in Kallenberg (1997) license omitting the potential outcomes from the construc-
tion in equation (38) of WB (arXiv version; this is equation 37 in JASA) is incorrect. This follows
from the fact that potential outcomes are part of the relevant measurable space S in Theorem 5.10
of Kallenberg. Our point is that, if potential outcomes are not included in (38), then they cannot be
included in (39) either (that is they cannot be included in equation 38 in JASA).
• As a counterexample to the claim that differentiability of f1 and f2 suffices for Theorem 6, we note
that f1 could be equal to f2( f (·)), in which case the two functions would be collinear.
Finally, we wish to highlight the assumption that Z is a deterministic function of the causes, which is crucial
to the original paper and to WB’s response. As discussed above, this implies that Z cannot be a confounder
according to standard definitions of confounding (see Analysis of Lemma 4, above). In Lemma 4 WB argue
that Z can be treated as a pre-treatment random variable (confounders are pre-treatment by definition), but
this is not true in general. A function’s inputs are causally antecedent to its output, therefore a function of
causes is a post-treatment variable. Furthermore, since Z is caused by each of the causes, it is a collider be-
tween the causes and, in the absence of extra assumptions, conditioning on it induces dependence among the
causes (Cole et al., 2009; Elwert and Winship, 2014). Even in a degenerate model in which a deterministic
function f (A) is equal to a pre-treatment variable, one cannot rule out that this same function f (A), or some
components of it, also operate as post-treatment random variables (see the first bullet point above).
It may be feasible to construct limited models in which a post-treatment function of the causes is equal to
a pre-treatment random variable, and therefore can be considered to be simultaneously pre-treatment and
post-treatment, e.g. when Z represents some types of clustering. But a Z that can be simultaneously pre- and
post-treatment is pathological indeed; among other pathologies it is only possible in settings that violate the
faithfulness assumption that underpins much of causal inference (Scheines, 1997). Such a variable would
not exist in most substantial settings in which we are interested in causal effects of multiple causes are of
interest.
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